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Some cultural goods, like clothes and films, are consumed socially and are thus 
characterized by the same consumption network externalities as languages.  At the 
same time, producers of new cultural goods in any one country draw on the stock of 
ideas generated by previous cultural production in all countries.  For such goods, 
costless trade and communication tend to lead to the dominance of one cultural 
style, increasing utility in the short run but reducing quality and generating cultural 
stagnation in the long run.  Increasing trade costs while keeping communication 
costs low may reduce welfare by stimulating production of cultural goods that are 
“compatible” with the dominant style, thereby capturing consumption network 
externalities, but that add little to the stock of usable ideas. Our two-country 
analysis suggests a reform of cultural policy whereby import restrictions in the 
smaller country are replaced by subsidies to the fixed costs of production of 
“authentic” new cultural goods, funded by contributions from the larger country. 
 
 
     
 
                                                 
* Our thanks to Helen and Newton Harrison for initial inspiration, to Doris Bittar, George Lewis, Leslie 
Stern, Sae Kyung Yu, and especially Dan Hallin for many helpful suggestions, and to Jennifer Poole for 
excellent research assistance.  We are responsible for any errors.   1
I  Introduction 
In this paper we intend to answer at least three questions.  First, why is the market 
share of U.S. or Anglo-American cultural goods so high in other cultures?  Second, why 
is cultural trade different from other trade in its welfare implications – or is it?  Third, 
what are the likely effects of policies adopted to protect domestic cultural goods 
production?  Our answers to these questions will lead to specific proposals regarding 
policy reforms in the area of international trade in cultural goods. 
Like others, we will argue that part of the reason for U.S. dominance in cultural 
goods is the home market effect (Helpman and Krugman 1985, section 10.4).  The home 
market effect results from the interaction of transportation costs with increasing returns to 
scale in a model of trade in differentiated products.  Transportation costs for cultural 
goods such as film and music are negligible, but as Hoskins et al. (1997) have pointed 
out, their place is taken by the “cultural discount” that consumers apply to cultural goods 
from a different culture.
1 
However, we question whether the standard home market effect alone could 
explain the extent of U.S. or Anglo-American dominance in cultural goods.  Table 1 
shows that in 2002 the median U.S. cinema market share across three large European and 
two Asian countries is 63 percent and the median ratio of the U.S. to national cinema 
market share is 2.9.  The U.S. cinema market share rivals the U.S. market share of 
roughly 70 percent (in 1998) in large commercial jet aircraft (Pavcnik 2002), which may 
be the highest U.S. market share for any well-defined commercial manufactured product.  
We lack data for the Anglo-American share of the popular music market, but we suspect 
                                                 
1 It is well known that home bias in preferences and “ice” transportation costs are equivalent in the “love of 
variety” monopolistic competition model of international trade.   2
that it is also unusually high, though probably not as high as the U.S. film market share 
(Economist 1998). 
U.S. or Anglo-American dominance could be explained by network externalities 
in cultural goods consumption.  Many writers have recognized the social nature of 
cultural goods consumption (Sintas and Álvarez 2002; Eaton, Pendakur, and Reed 2003).  
Traditionally these social interactions have taken place within a culture, but falling 
communication and transportation costs, student exchanges, and most recently internet 
chat rooms and music file-sharing have increased social interactions across cultures.  It is 
no surprise then that the U.S. cultural market share is increasing, as reflected in the 
cinema market shares reported in Table 1. 
Janeba (2004) sees the social consumption property of cultural goods as making 
their consumption an input to production of national “identity,” giving rise to special 
welfare implications of cultural goods trade.  In contrast, from a static point of view we 
treat trade in cultural goods as being no different than trade in any consumption network 
externality good, such as computer software.  We emphasize instead a difference in the 
dynamic implications of such trade.  As in Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman 
(1991), we argue that production of current cultural goods generates ideas that spill over 
to future cultural goods production.  We also make the crucial assumptions that producers 
of cultural goods have access to the ideas generated by past cultural goods production of 
all cultures, and that ideas of different cultures are imperfect substitutes. 
There can be little doubt that producers of commercially lucrative cultural goods 
are influenced by ideas from other cultures.  This is true of producers in the dominant 
culture as well.  For example, the “film noir” style, considered by many to be the most   3
enduring achievement of 1940s Hollywood, was heavily influenced by German 
expressionist cinema.
2  George Lucas spent months in Japan in the early 1970s soaking 
up Japanese films before creating Star Wars, which borrows many key elements directly 
from the work of the great Japanese director Akira Kurosawa.
3  In music, it is universally 
acknowledged that Anglo-American “rock and roll” grew out of “rhythm and blues,” a 
musical style of African-Americans in the U.S. South (see, e.g., Stuessy 1990) that in turn 
has its roots in West Africa.
4   The Beatles then led a revolution in rock and roll while 
under the influence of the European avant-garde, especially the electronic music of 
Karlheinz Stockhausen.
5 
The imperfect substitutability of ideas from different cultures in production of 
new cultural goods is a more controversial assumption, and it has the crucial implication 
that the ideas that spill over from the cultural goods production of the subordinate 
culture(s) are more valuable because they are more scarce.   Cultural scholars categorize 
film and music by national or cultural/linguistic “schools” or genres, each of which has a 
set of recognizable characteristics.
6  It stands to reason, then, that a producer of new film 
                                                 
2 Hirsch (1981, p. 53) writes, “The cinematic origins of film noir can be traced to the German Expressionist 
films of the late 1910s and twenties”.  Double Indemnity (1944) is one of the signature Hollywood films in 
this style. 
3 Baxter (1999, p. 73) states, “Lucas loved the formalized sword-duels of Kurosawa’s historical films….No 
less attractive were his themes:  loyalty to a lord; honor; mutual respect among warriors; fidelity to 
bushido, the samurai code.” 
4 Evans (2002, pp. 23-24) describes the influences of African music on the harmony, instrumentation, and 
even subject matter of rhythm and blues songs. 
5 Everett (1999, p. 10) writes that Paul McCartney “introduced the Beatles to the worlds of Stockhausen 
and Bach, leading to a revolution in the expressive capacity of mainstream rock music.”  Stockhausen 
appears in the crowd on the celebrated cover of Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band. 
6 For example, Thomas (1985), writing about “Indian popular cinema,” states, “What seems to emerge in 
Hindi cinema is an emphasis on emotion and spectacle rather than tight narrative, on how things will 
happen rather than what will happen next, on a succession of modes rather than linear denouement, on 
familiarity and repeated viewings rather than ‘originality’ and novelty, on a moral disordering to be 
(temporarily) resolved rather than an enigma to be solved.”  Slonimsky (1997, p. 29) states of “Arab 
music” that “The traditional music of Arab nations of the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf basins differs so 
greatly from the nature of Western music that transcription with any degree of fidelity into Western   4
or music will get ideas from watching, listening to, and studying the film or music of 
other cultures that are qualitatively different from the ideas he absorbs from the film or 
music of his own culture.
 7 
Our argument suggests that, by preserving cultural diversity, protection of cultural 
goods production can generate dynamic welfare gains that offset the static welfare losses 
it causes.
8  To understand the likely long-term effects of protection, however, we turn to a 
cultural good for which the rest of the world does not fear U.S. or Western dominance, 
but quite the opposite:  clothing.  Clothing is not only an integral part of culture but also a 
consumption network externality good par excellence:  people dress up to be seen by 
others.  Perhaps as a result, Western clothing appears to have achieved a market share 
outside of the West comparable to the U.S. cinema market share, despite its occasional 
inappropriateness (as millions of necktie-wearing tropical businessmen and office 
workers will attest).
9   At the same time, clothing was the lead industry in import-
substituting industrialization throughout the world, and now the Western share of 
clothing production is far smaller than the Western share of clothing style. 
The example of clothing shows that the long-term effect of protection is not likely 
to be preservation of cultural diversity but rather imitation of the goods produced by the 
dominant culture, as producers in other cultures respond to the demand created by 
consumption network externalities.  Language barriers make low-wage export platform 
                                                                                                                                                 
notation is fraught with difficulties….The melodies themselves register to a Western-trained ear as 
progressions of quarter tones, semitones, and other divisions of a whole tone.” 
7 In our model, we will assume that the same set of ideas processed through a Chinese or Indian 
“sensibility” yields Chinese film or Indian music rather than U.S. film or music.  We argue that the same 
cannot be said of a spreadsheet program, for example, which will be no more different from other 
spreadsheet programs than if it had been designed by U.S. software producers. 
8 Ottaviano and Peri (2004) find evidence that cultural diversity makes U.S. cities more productive. 
9 Non-western clothing survives mainly in rural areas where opportunities for social interactions with 
Westerners, both real and virtual, are much more limited.   5
production of film and music unlikely, but import substitution with some exports is the 
outcome we predict.  An excellent example is provided by the experience of Argentina in 
the 1990s.  Under the Menem regime, heavy state subsidies were provided to domestic 
film production.  Content was deregulated but participation of domestic television 
stations was encouraged to insure commercial viability of output.  The result was the 
production of films such as Comodines (Cops), billed as “the first Hollywood-style movie 
spoken in Spanish,” and a smash hit in Argentina (Falicov 2000, p. 330). 
Ironically, the Argentine experience also points towards the policy 
recommendations generated by our model.  As in the 1990s under Menem, in the 1980s 
under Alfonsín Argentina provided state subsidies to domestic film production, but 
projects were chosen “with an international film festival audience in mind, rather than a 
domestic one” (Falicov 2000, p. 334).  This maximized the spillover of ideas from 
Argentine film output while allowing Argentine consumers to enjoy the consumption 
network externalities from U.S. films.  What made this policy package unsustainable, of 
course, was that the main beneficiaries were not the Argentine taxpayers who were 
financing the subsidies.  We shall recommend that if this kind of policy package is to be 
sustained, the foreigners who reap most of the benefits will have to bear more of the 
subsidy burden. 
To support the intuition presented here and generate additional results, in the next 
section we will develop a model of international trade in differentiated products subject 
to consumption network externalities.  The static part of our model should apply equally 
well to non-cultural goods subject to such externalities, such as computer software.  We 
believe that the dynamic part and the policy implications that flow from it only apply to   6
trade in cultural goods, however.  In section III we derive both positive and normative 
results for our basic model.  We add the possibility of imitative cultural goods production 
in section IV.   In our concluding section we explore the lessons that our model and 
results provide for cultural policy. 
 
II.  The Model 
  Our model builds upon the well-known home market effect model of Helpman 
and Krugman (1985, section 10.4), and we will adopt their notation where convenient.  
There are two industries, one producing a differentiated product and the other a 
homogeneous product.  We will call the differentiated product industry the cultural goods 
industry.  We assume Cobb-Douglas utility for the two goods, yielding constant 
expenditure shares, and we will let the subutility for cultural goods take the standard CES 
form.  There are two countries, home and foreign. We distinguish all foreign variables by 
labeling them with an asterisk.  Production technology is identical across countries, but 
the cultures of each country are distinct.  There is one factor of production, which we 
shall call labor.   
  The homogeneous product is costlessly tradable and both countries produce it 
when there is trade.  It is produced under constant returns to scale and perfect 
competition, which ensures that the wage rate will be the same in both countries.  
Cultural goods are produced under increasing returns to scale, with a fixed cost and 
constant marginal cost, in a monopolistic competition setting. 
  Our first change to the Helpman-Krugman model is that we assume that cultural 
goods are costlessly transportable, but they are subject to a “cultural discount” by   7
domestic consumers.  This change proves to be only notational, i.e., the cultural discount 
in our model is equivalent to the “ice” transportation cost in the Helpman-Krugman 
model.  Our second change is to assume that the utility from consuming cultural goods is 
augmented by consumption network externalities, which we will specify below. Our third 
change is to assume that the utility from consumption of cultural goods is also augmented 
by the quality of cultural goods production, which in turn is a function of past cultural 
goods production through spillover of ideas. 
  These three changes are incorporated into the utility function of the representative 





































τ τ τ τ
α
τ τ δ
     (1) 
where τ indexes time; Cy is the consumption of the homogeneous good by the 
representative home country consumer; C and C
~
are the consumptions by the home 
consumer of a typical variety of the home and foreign cultural good, respectively; δ is the 
cultural discount rate, where we assume that  1 0 < <δ ; H and H
~ measure the 
consumption network externalities enjoyed by consuming home and foreign cultural 
goods, respectively; n and n* are the number of varieties of home and foreign cultural 
good that are produced, respectively; Q is the quality of cultural goods production; and r 
is the time discount rate. In equation (1),  τ u is the instantaneous utility at time τ , and 
t U is total utility, discounted to time t. We have incorporated into the utility function the 
symmetry of all home and all foreign varieties of cultural good.     8
  The utility of the representative foreign country consumer is symmetric to 
equation (1) and can be written as follows:   
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     (2) 
where the notation is in all respects analogous to equation (1). Note that the assumption 
of equal cultural discounting by home and foreign consumers is made for notational 
simplicity, and does not qualitatively affect our results. 
  Equations (1) and (2) incorporate the assumption that the quality of all cultural 
goods production is the same across the two countries, implying that the ideas generated 
by production of past cultural goods have the same spillover to both home and foreign 
producers. Thus, the model works as if all cultural goods producers attend the same 
international film and music festivals, making the gains from past cultural production a 
public good.  We could easily let each country’s producers give more weight to the ideas 
generated by past production in their own country without qualitatively changing our 
results, but we maintain symmetry for simplicity.   
  For the quality of current period production of cultural goods we specifically 
assume:  
  Qτ = Q(nτ-1,
*
1 − τ n ). 
This equation incorporates two important additional assumptions.  First, ideas generated 
by past production of home and foreign varieties of cultural goods are imperfect 
substitutes in production of current cultural good quality, as we argued in our 
introduction.  We assume this implies that the marginal product of an additional past   9
variety of a country is increasing with the relative scarcity of that country’s past varieties.  
Second, current cultural goods quality depends only on varieties produced in the 
immediately preceding period; there is no accumulation of ideas that would cause cultural 
goods quality to increase over time.
10  This means that there is no state variable in the 
model, and we can drop the time subscript to simplify notation. 
  We complete the specification of our model by defining the consumption network 
externalities: 
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D n D n H H + = γ , 
where the different Ds are aggregate demand for a given variety of cultural good, with an 
asterisk denoting consumption by foreign consumers, and a tilde denoting consumption 
of foreign varieties. In the equation above, γ is a parameter such that 0 < γ < 1, and H(.) is 
an increasing function of its argument, where for simplicity we assume that H(0) = 1.  
There are two key features of our specification.  First, consumption network externalities 
are stronger within a country than across countries, with the extent of cross-country 
externalities determined by γ, a parameter that we can think of as measuring 
“globalization.”  Second, externalities for any variety depend not only on consumption of 
that individual variety but also on consumption of all “compatible” varieties, i.e., 
varieties produced within the same culture. 
                                                 
10 Thus, cultural goods producers in our model are only influenced by “fresh ideas.”  In reality, current 
cultural goods producers may also get ideas from archived film and music, for example, nearly all of which 
loses relevance with time.  Allowing for less than 100 percent depreciation of cultural ideas after two 
periods would mean that the impact on future cultural goods quality of changes in current numbers of 
varieties of cultural goods being produced would unfold more slowly.   10
This second feature may be controversial.  We argue that a major reason why film 
is socially consumed is that people like to discuss the films they see.  Discussion will 
often involve comparison with other, similar films, so enjoyment of any given film is 
enhanced by the extent to which similar films have been seen by the participants in the 
discussion.  Music needs to be compatible to be programmed by DJs at events and on the 
radio and for dance music at parties, so again, demand for any given piece of music is 
enhanced by the extent to which similar music is consumed by others.  Obviously, the 
symmetry across all varieties in our consumption network externality specification is 
unrealistic:  externalities will be stronger within than across genres (action-adventure 
versus romantic comedy, country-western versus rock), and stronger for the variety in 
question than for other compatible varieties.  Incorporating these complications would 
not qualitatively affect our results, provided that each individual producer is still too 
small to affect the sum of consumption network externalities for its variety of cultural 
good. 
 
III. Model Solution and Results 
It is easy to show that we obtain the standard CES demands for cultural goods, 
which are therefore given by: 
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where σ ≡ 1/(1-ρ) is the elasticity of substitution between any two varieties of the cultural 
good, and p is the price of any variety in either country in monopolistic competition 
equilibrium [need to add definitions of L, L*, recall w = w* = 1].  In monopolistic 
competition equilibrium, p will be fixed by the constant markup and the constant wage 
(which determines a constant marginal cost).  Note that cultural goods quality Q drops 
out of the demand for cultural goods. This occurs because the Cobb-Douglas 
specification of the utility function makes Q
α a shifter of the entire level of utility. 
  As in the Helpman-Krugman model, the output of any variety in monopolistic 
competition is fixed and equal across countries.  Denoting this output by x, we have two 
market clearing conditions: 





D  = x.           (4) 
Equations (3) and (4) give us six equations in the six unknowns:  n, n*, D, D
~
, D*, and 
* ~
D .  If the function H were identically one, the model would reduce to the Helpman-
Krugman model.  Indeed, it will be convenient to assume that the function H is bounded 
from above by 1/δ.  To see why, combine the two market-clearing conditions to obtain: 




D - D*. 
Substituting the equations for the demands (equations 3) in the equation above and 
eliminating p and α yields: 
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Now suppose that n* approaches zero, so that  1
~
,
~ * → H H . Then, 
* * ~
D D −  (the right-
hand side of the equation above) approaches a positive term times 
1 *) ( 1
− −
σ δH . 
Therefore, we want  δ 1
* < H , since 
* D D−  (left-hand side of the equation) is certainly 
positive. 
  We can gain some intuition about the behavior of the model by rearranging the 
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 As L/L* increases, we expect n/n* to increase because home consumers demand 
relatively more home cultural goods than foreign cultural goods, due to the cultural 
discount.  Indeed, if we let H for a moment be a constant function, it is clear from 
equation (5) that this result must obtain (recall that  1 < δ ).  However, we can also see 
that, through the H functions, the increase in n/n* will tend to reinforce, rather than 
offset, the increase in L/L*.  Note that if this tendency is strong enough, n/n* will actually 
have to fall in response to an increase in L/L* in order to maintain equation (5).
11  Thus, 
the consumption network externality cannot be too strong (i.e., H′ cannot be too large) if 
our model is to be well behaved.  We therefore maintain the assumption of a sufficiently 
weak externality for the remainder of this paper. 
  We can further use equation (5) to study the impact of globalization, which we 
model as an increase in γ.
12  We conjecture that an increase in γ will cause a larger 
                                                 
11 We have established through simulation that increasing the strength of the consumption network 
externality (i.e., increasing H′) can switch the impact of L/L* on n/n* from positive to negative. 
12 One example of why this may be true is the rise of the Internet, possibly the most often-mentioned 
dimension of globalization. We can conjecture that the increase in chatrooms and other specialized 
websites where people from all over the world exchange opinions and share common interests is precisely 
one way in which consumption externalities in cultural goods can cross borders in a more intensive way.   13




H , i.e., it will increase the consumption 
network externality effect for home goods relative to that for foreign goods, thereby 
raising n/n*.   For concreteness, consider the ratio H*/
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H .  Logarithmic differentiation of 
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 Let n* approach zero. Since H(0) = 1, this expression becomes positive, provided that 
H′(0) is finite.  In this limit, the percentage change in H* must therefore exceed the 
percentage change in 
* ~
H .  As n* approaches n the percentage change in 
* ~
H  (the second 
term of the expression above) increases relative to the percentage change in H*, but we 
know that for n* = n we must have L* = L, in which case the two countries are 
completely symmetric and we must have d(n/n*)/dγ = 0. 
We have now established the intuition for the following propositions and lemmas, 
which we expect to prove in a future draft of this paper: 
 Proposition  1:  Given L > L*, n/n* increases with γ. That is, increased 
globalization raises the market share of the large country in cultural goods. 
 Lemma  1:  The minimum L* consistent with n* > 0 increases with γ. That is, 
increased globalization means that cultural goods production will disappear from 
increasingly large countries (that are still smaller than the home country). 
  A test of the predictions of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1 would involve changes 
over time.  Our model also makes cross-sectional predictions that may be easier to test.  
These concern market shares for cultural goods that differ in the extent to which they are 
socially consumed.   14
 Proposition  2:  Consider two types of cultural goods, 1 and 2, such that 
(d/dz)lnH1(z) > (d/dz)lnH2(z).  That is, good 1 is more “sensitive” to network 
consumption externalities than good 2. We will obtain n1/n1* > n2/n2*, i.e., the market 
share of the large country will be greater for cultural goods with stronger consumption 
network externalities. 
 Lemma  2: The minimum L* consistent with n1* > 0 is larger than the minimum 
L* consistent with n2* > 0. Thus, production will disappear when the foreign (small) 
country is relatively large when the cultural goods have stronger consumption network 
externalities. 
The most promising way to test Proposition 2 or Lemma 2 is to look within a 
category of cultural goods for types that clearly differ in the extent to which the social 
aspect of consumption is important.  This will hold constant as many confounding factors 
(e.g., comparative advantage and trade costs) as possible.  For example, we would predict 
that the market share of Western clothing would be greater for business attire than for 
sleepwear.  An especially interesting comparison is film versus television.  Even 
primetime television is less viewed and discussed with individuals outside the home than 
are films.  The consensus view among media scholars is that the U.S. share of foreign 
television viewing, even for primetime, is far below the U.S. share of foreign cinema 
admissions.
13  Unfortunately, systematic ratings data giving market shares of U.S. and 
foreign programming are unavailable or expensive for most countries.  We know that the 
U.S. audience share for the largest commercial network in S. Korea has fluctuated 
between 5 and 13 percent during the period 1992-2002 [reference needed here] 
                                                 
13 Straubhaar (2002, p. 197) states, “As ratings in many countries reflect, audiences usually tend to prefer 
local programming when they can get it.”   15
(compared to a cinema market share of 49 percent in Table 1).  An article in Variety 
(Johnson 2003) notes, “A recent survey by Nielsen Media Research found that 71% of 
the top ten programs in 60 countries were locally produced.”  As an example of the 
cultural specificity to which local producers cater, the article cites the popularity of 
“religious fiction” in Italy:  “Hardly a week goes by without a spiritual offering in 
primetime, a series or made-for based on the Bible or the lives of popes and saints.  The 
latest example of religious fiction was dedicated to the saint Maria Goretti and drew 10 
million viewers (a 35% share).” 
In order to increase their cultural goods market shares, countries around the world 
such as Australia, Canada, France, and S. Korea have turned to protectionist measures 
such as requiring that a minimum percentage of total domestic screen time or of each 
broadcaster’s programming be domestic content (Hoskins et al. 1997).  For the remainder 
of this section we investigate the welfare effects of an ad valorem tariff imposed by the 
foreign country on imports of home cultural goods, which can be thought of as the tariff 
equivalent of a quantitative restriction.  We rewrite foreign country demands as: 
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where T equals one plus the tariff rate, and for simplicity we have assumed that the 
government spends all tariff revenue on the homogeneous product.  We can then go on to 
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We see that the direct effects of increasing T are all to decrease n/n*, and we assume that 
these dominate any indirect effects through the H functions (which should be a 
consequence of having sufficiently weak consumption network externalities to ensure 
that the model is well behaved). 
We can now establish the following proposition. 
 Proposition  3:  Protection of cultural goods production in the small country (the 
foreign country) can increase welfare of the representative consumer in both home and 
foreign.   
  In the current period protection reduces welfare of the representative foreign 
consumer by raising prices of imported cultural goods, and reduces welfare for all 
consumers by causing the number of varieties available to be below the free-market 
equilibrium level of α(L + L*)/px.
14  In all future periods, however, these effects can be 
dominated by increased quality of cultural goods.  The effect of protection on future 
quality will be larger the smaller is the initial market share of the foreign country.  When 
improved quality dominates the loss from the price distortion and reduced variety, 
welfare of the representative consumer in both the foreign and home countries increases 
provided the rate of time discount is sufficiently small. 
Note that since globalization has the opposite effects on relative market shares 
from protection, it can cause welfare of the representative consumer in both countries to 
fall despite the static benefits of increased consumption network externalities. The fall in 
welfare of the representative home consumer could be termed “cultural blowback.”  
 
                                                 
14 This effect can only be avoided if the foreign government spends all the tariff revenue it collects on 
cultural goods.   17
 
IV. Imitative Cultural Production 
In this section, we introduce the possibility of imitative cultural production into 
our model.  Imitative cultural production is defined as the production of cultural goods 
that share the cultural discount properties of domestic cultural goods but the consumption 
network externalities of the other country’s cultural goods (i.e., they are “compatible” 
with the other country’s cultural goods).  Imitative film would be film that adopts the plot 
conventions and cinematic style of the other country while employing domestic actors 
and using a domestic setting.  Imitative music would be music that adopts the rhythm, 
harmony, and instrumentation of the other country while employing domestic singers and 
using lyrics that address domestic concerns and values.  The use of the domestic language 
by the actors or singers in imitative cultural goods would be the most important element 
in maintaining the cultural discount properties of domestic cultural goods, whereas the 
adoption of core features of the other country’s cultural goods would allow imitative 
films to be part of the same “conversation” as the other country’s films and imitative 
music to be programmed with the other country’s music at parties and on the radio. 
There are now potentially two types of cultural goods being produced in each 
country.  For clarity, we will refer to the cultural goods already present in the model of 
the previous section as “authentic,” as opposed to “imitative.”  (We recognize that 
“authentic” is a loaded term and will discuss some of the issues it raises in our 
conclusions.)  We assume that the fixed cost of producing imitative cultural goods is a 
multiple λ > 1 of the fixed cost of producing authentic cultural goods, reflecting the costs 
to domestic producers of adopting the unfamiliar features of the other country’s cultural   18
goods.
15  We also assume that producers of authentic cultural goods are the 
“incumbents,” and that potential producers of imitative goods only enter if it is profitable 
given the existing levels of consumption network externalities.  With these assumptions, 
it is easy to see that imitative cultural goods will not be introduced in the home country, 
because cost is higher and the consumption network externality is smaller than for 
authentic cultural goods.  We will therefore only consider the possibility of imitative 
cultural production in the foreign country. 
Let * D  and 
*
* D  be the home and foreign demand for a foreign imitative good, 
respectively.  The condition for successful entry of imitative goods producers is then 
easily shown to be * D +
*
* D  ≥ λx, where  * D  and 
*
* D are evaluated at the equilibrium 




* = x, this condition can be rewritten as 
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*).  It is then easily shown that ( H H
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σ-1 ≥ λ is a sufficient condition for  * D +
*




*) to hold.  
Intuitively, it is profitable to introduce imitative production when its consumption 
network externality in the foreign country is sufficiently high relative to that of authentic 
production to offset its higher cost. 
We now have the following results. 
                                                 
15 The marginal costs of producing the physical film or CD are presumably the same for both types of 
cultural goods, though the marginal costs of imitative cultural goods could also be higher if, for example, it 
was necessary to hire supporting artists from the other country and pay them royalties.   19
Proposition 4:  Globalization favors introduction of imitative production.  This 
follows because 
* * ~
H H is increasing in γ.  [This has only been proven rigorously for n* 
= 0.] 
Proposition 5:  With homogeneous foreign consumers, authentic and imitative 
production cannot coexist in equilibrium.  In equilibrium we must have  * D +
*
* D  = λx.  
Since  * D +
*




*) evaluated at the equilibrium without imitative production, it 




* evaluated at the equilibrium without imitative production.  It is 





* < x when there is positive imitative production in 
equilibrium. 
Proposition 6:  In the presence of imitative production, foreign protection must 
reduce foreign and world welfare.  The key to this result, of course, is that imitative 
foreign varieties are treated as perfect substitutes for home varieties in the production of 
cultural good quality.  The current mix of varieties between home and foreign no longer 
affects the quality of future cultural production; only the total number of current varieties 
matters.  With total expenditure on cultural goods fixed at α(L + L*), the total number of 
varieties must fall with foreign protection because the price of home varieties rises for 
foreign consumers and because each foreign variety requires more real resources given 
that imitative production is more expensive than authentic production.  Thus, in addition 
to its standard distortionary impact, protection must also lower welfare by reducing the 
quality of future cultural production. 
This strong negative result for the impact of foreign protection is suspect because 
it follows from the result that imitative production completely drives out authentic   20
production in the foreign country, which is clearly not true in the real world.  In order to 
allow authentic and imitative production to coexist in the foreign country, we need to 
allow for consumer heterogeneity there.  We do so by dividing foreign consumers into 
two groups, “urban” and “rural.”  Urban foreign consumers have stronger social 
interactions with home country consumers than do rural foreign consumers.  Since 
imitative goods share the consumption network externalities of home country cultural 
goods, urban foreign consumers will tend to have stronger preferences for imitative 
relative to authentic goods.
16  In equilibrium, we will have 
* * ~
U U H H > 
* * ~
R R H H , recalling 
that H* applies equally to home cultural goods and foreign imitative cultural goods. 
This model is too complicated to solve.  However, we can gain some intuition 
about its behavior by developing the market clearing conditions for authentic and 
imitative cultural goods.  For each of the two types of goods we sum home, urban 





U D  + 
* ~
R D  = x. 
* D  + 
*
*U D  + 
*
*R D  = λx. 
Letting  * n denote the number of varieties of the imitative foreign cultural good produced 
in equilibrium, µ denote the urban share of foreign consumers, and T denote one plus the 
tariff rate on imported home cultural goods, we can expand these two market clearing 
conditions as follows: 
                                                 
16 The terminology “urban” and “rural” suggests that we are treating “authentic” as equivalent to 
“traditional.”  We will return to the relationship between the concepts of “authentic” and “traditional” 
cultural production in our conclusions.   21
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where for simplicity we have assumed that the foreign government spends all the tariff 
revenue it collects on the homogeneous good.  We can then divide both sides of equation 
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  We see from equation (8) that increasing globalization (γ), by raising 
*
U H  relative 
to 
* ~
U H  and 
*
R H  relative to 
* ~
R H , operates in the same direction as increasing urbanization 
(µ), as expected.  (Effects throughD
~
 and  * D  can be assumed to be small.)   The more 
interesting question is the effect of increasing protection (T).  Focusing on the   22
denominators in equation (8), we see that a higher T, like a higher µ, raises the left-hand 
side relative to the right-hand side because 
*
U H  > 
*
R H .  This reflects the fact that urban 
consumers have a stronger preference for foreign goods because they are more 
“globalized” and therefore will experience a stronger impact from protection and a 
stronger substitution effect towards domestic goods than rural consumers.  This will 
stimulate demand for imitative goods relative to authentic goods because urban 
consumers have a stronger preference for the former.  Turning to the numerators in 
equation (8), we expect 
* ~
U H to increase relative to
*
U H  and 
* ~
R H  to increase relative to
*
R H  
because authentic goods do not share consumption network externalities with home 
goods.  This effect will be greater, the larger is n* relative to  * n , because the substitution 
effect towards domestic consumption will then have a greater impact on consumption 
network externalities for authentic goods than for imitative goods.  Given that the effects 
of protection on the numerators and denominators of equation (8) are offsetting, we 
conjecture that protection will promote authentic cultural production in the foreign 
country only when the ratio of rural to urban consumers (or “unglobalized” to 
“globalized” consumers) and thus n* to  * n  is high.  It may be that this occurred in post-
revolution Iran, where strong government restrictions on imported films gave rise to a 
vigorous authentic domestic cinema that is described as “one of the pre-eminent national 
cinemas in the world today” by both the New York Film Festival and Toronto 
International Film Festival (Naficy 2003, p. 138). 
   23
V. Lessons for Cultural Policy 
Our model is full of distortions:  pricing above marginal cost in monopolistic 
competition equilibrium, consumption network externalities, and knowledge spillovers.  
An optimal policy package to address all of these distortions is likely to be quite 
complicated and, more importantly in our view, quite unrealistic in terms of the demands 
it would make on government implementation capacity.  Our goal in this concluding 
section is much more modest:  to find a Pareto-improving reform of cultural policy that 
builds on existing institutions and practices and is therefore feasible to implement. 
Current cultural policy in many countries is to set aside some percentage of total 
domestic screen time for domestically produced film and some percentage of total 
domestic air time for domestically produced music or television (UNESCO n.d.).  These 
are quantitative restrictions, for which tariff equivalents can be found (at least in theory).  
According to our model, it is at least possible that these policies are welfare-improving, 
because they may be increasing production of authentic cultural goods that generate ideas 
with large marginal impacts on the quality of future cultural goods output in all countries.  
However, to the extent that these policies protect or even stimulate production of 
imitative cultural goods, they are purely welfare-decreasing.  This negative outcome 
becomes more likely over time as globalization makes imitative production ever more 
attractive.  In either case, standard economic reasoning suggests that import restrictions 
are an inefficient way to achieve a target level of domestic output.  In our model, 
moreover, replacing import restrictions with production subsidies has the special 
advantage that production subsidies can be directed towards authentic production, 
whereas import restrictions cannot.  Our recommendation for reform of cultural policy is   24
therefore that import restrictions be removed and replaced by production subsidies that 
maintain at least the pre-existing level of authentic cultural output.   (In a future draft we 
expect to formally prove that such a reform must be Pareto-improving.) 
Since the purpose of subsidizing production of authentic cultural goods is to make 
the ideas embedded in them available to producers worldwide, subsidies should be to the 
fixed costs of production rather than to the marginal costs of production or distribution.  
The cultural output should then be made available to international film and music 
festivals at no more than marginal cost.  Our policy reform thus translates into replacing 
import restrictions with a combination of increases in the budgets for national arts 
agencies and retargeting of their existing resources, which sometimes appear to be aimed 
more at supporting domestic cultural employment than domestic cultural ideas 
(Economist 1998).  The practical difficulty with implementation of this reform, to which 
we already alluded in our introduction, is that taxpayers in small countries would be 
explicitly funding programs for which most of the benefits accrue to the rest of the world, 
simply by virtue of its larger size.  This suggests that, in exchange for removing its 
restrictions on imports of cultural goods, a small country should ask the large country 
(the United States) to contribute to the funding of its national arts agency.  The 
contribution could be made directly, or indirectly via increased U.S. funding of a  
supranational agency such as UNESCO. 
Our discussion so far has assumed that the national arts agencies that administer 
production subsidies for cultural goods will have no difficulties in distinguishing 
authentic from imitative production.  In practice, explicit targeting on the basis of 
“authenticity” runs the risk of favoring cultural production that is considered to be safely   25
“traditional,” which could stifle rather than reward creativity and thus reduce the quality 
of the ideas that are embedded in the output.  A better strategy might be to make 
“originality” a major criterion for funding, which will be an effective criterion to the 
extent that culturally imitative production also tends to be imitative in the sense of 
“unoriginal.”  In the final analysis, however, appropriate criteria for national arts agencies 
should be developed with input from producers themselves, who hold the real expertise in 
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Table 1 
U.S. & National Cinema Market Shares
1985 2002
U.S. National U.S. National
France 39 44 56 34
G e r m a n y5 92 38 31 2
I t a l y 4 93 26 32 2
South Korea 49 45
Thailand 75 23
Notes: Market shares for Thailand are based on gross box office receipts, while all 
other countries' market shares are based on total admissions.  Shares from 1985 
are the earliest available figures for France, Germany and Italy.  No earlier 
observations are available for South Korea and Thailand.
Sources: European Audiovisual Observatory; Screen Digest; Spitzenorganisation 
der Filmwirtschaft; Variety Magazine.  
 
 
 